



# **Effective Patent Life of Antiretroviral Drugs in the U.S 1987-2006: A Public Health Perspective**

**Enrique C. Seoane Vazquez**

Assistant Professor, College of Pharmacy and College of Public Health  
Scholar, Center for HOPES. Ohio State University

**Rosa Rodriguez-Monguio**

Assistant Professor, School of Public Health  
University of Massachusetts

**APHA 2007 Annual Meeting & Exposition  
Washington, DC, November 6, 2007**

# Outline

- ❖ **Background**
- ❖ **Study Objectives**
- ❖ **Data Sources**
- ❖ **Methods**
- ❖ **Results**
- ❖ **Conclusions**
- ❖ **Limitations**
- ❖ **Implications**

# **Background:**


## **Access, Prices and Patents**

- ❖ **Society is faced with balancing the reward from innovation for finding new drugs with adequate access to affordable drugs**
- ❖ **Difficult balance for antiretrovirals (ARVs) and drugs targeting life-threatening diseases**
- ❖ **High prices of patented ARVs reduce access**
- ❖ **Generic drug entry reduces prices**
- ❖ **Patents are the main barrier to generic entry**

# Study Objectives

- ❖ **To examine the effective patent life periods of new molecular entities (NMEs) approved for marketing in the United States between 1987 and 2006**
- ❖ **To compare the effective patent life of ARVs and other therapeutic classes**

# Conceptual Model: Drug Patent Life



# Data Sources

- ❖ **FDA and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office**
- ❖ **NMEs approved during the period 1987-2006**
- ❖ **NMEs with at least one patent listed in the FDA Orange Book (OB)**
  - **OB lists drugs approved by the FDA and patents affecting new drugs**
  - **Excludes manufacturing process patents**
- ❖ **Drugs discontinued from the market were excluded from the analysis**
- ❖ **Data was updated to December 31, 2006**

# Methods

- ❖ **First and last patents used to estimate minimum and maximum effective patent life**
- ❖ **A comparison between the effective patent life of ARVs and all other NMEs was performed**
- ❖ **Sub-analysis ARVs and all other NMEs**
  - **Priority review**  
(FDA considered drug to be an improvement)
  - **Orphan drugs**
- ❖ **Group comparison t-tests**
- ❖ **SPSS vs. 15 used for the analysis**

# Results



# Drug Sample

**532 NMEs approved in 1987-2006**

**- 105 without a patent listed in the OB**

**- 43 discontinued**


**384 included in the study**

**21 (5.5%) ARVs**

**363 (94.5%) NMEs from other classes**


# FDA Review Time. Antiretrovirals and Other Therapeutic Classes. 1987-2006

Years




# FDA NDA Approval to First Patent Expiration Time. Antiretrovirals and Other Therapeutic Classes. 1987-2006

Years



# FDA NDA Approval to Last Patent Expiration Time. Antiretrovirals and Other Therapeutic Classes. 1987-2006

Years



# Time from FDA NDA Approval to Last Patent Expiration. ARVs, 1987-2006



# **Conclusions, Limitations and Implications**

# Conclusions

- ❖ **Statistically significant difference in effective patent life of ARVs vs. other classes**
- ❖ **ARVs had an average of 2.9 years more effective first patent life than other classes**
- ❖ **ARVs had an average of 2.8 years more effective last patent life than other classes**

# Conclusions

- ❖ **Shorter ARV FDA review time explains 50% of the difference in effective patent life**
- ❖ **Effective patent life for the last patent of 7 ARVs (33.3%) exceeded 20 years**



# Limitations of the Study

## ❖ Subject Selection

- Includes first product number of the first NDA and excludes successive NDAs (line extensions)

## ❖ Patent Selection

- Includes first and last patent listed in the OB
- Excludes other patents listed in the OB and patents not listed

## ❖ Intellectual property

- Excludes intellectual property rights other than patents (i.e. exclusivity)

# A Public Health Perspective

- ❖ **Shortening ARV development and the FDA drug review process increased ARV effective patent life**
  - **Faster entry to new drugs**
  - **Potential for improved access for HIV patients**
- ❖ **Implications for other therapeutic categories**
  - **ARVs higher risk benefit ratio than other therapeutic classes**
  - **Pandemic disease**
  - **Perspectives: Patients, FDA, Health plans, Industry**

# **A Public Health Perspective (&2)**

- ❖ **ARV may generate higher rewards for pharmaceutical companies**
  - **Less development opportunity costs**
  - **Longer effective patent life without generic competition**
- ❖ **Need for balancing intellectual drug property rights and access to ARVs**
  - **Balance at the therapeutic category level**

# **An International Public Health Perspective**

- ❖ **The U.S. pharmaceutical patent and FDA exclusivity system exceeds TRIPS**
  - **Patent extensions and pediatric exclusivity**
- ❖ **Bilateral agreements may extend pharmaceutical intellectual property protection in developing countries**
  - **Effects on prices and access**

*TRIPS: Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (World Trade Organization)*



# **Effective Patent Life of Antiretroviral Drugs in the U.S 1987-2006: A Public Health Perspective**

**Enrique C. Seoane Vazquez**

Assistant Professor, College of Pharmacy and College of Public Health  
Scholar, Center for HOPES. Ohio State University

**Rosa Rodriguez-Monguio**

Assistant Professor, School of Public Health  
University of Massachusetts

**APHA 2007 Annual Meeting & Exposition Washington, DC, November 6, 2007**

**Results of this study were presented at the iHEA 6th World Congress. Copenhagen, July 11, 2007**