Nathaniel Wander, PhD, Center for Tobacco Control Research & Education/ Dept of Social & Behavioral Science, University of California, San Francisco, 530 Parnassus Ste 366, Box 1390, San Francisco, CA 94143-1390, 415-514-9342, nwander@itsa.ucsf.edu and Ruth E. Malone, RN, PhD, Dept. of Social & Behavioral Sciences and Center for Tobacco Control Research & Education, University of California, San Francisco, Box 1390, San Francisco, CA 94143-1390.

In 1988, shareholder responsibility activists began demanding that the US tobacco industry include US-style health warnings on cigarettes sold abroad. They asserted an equivalence with marketing other products too dangerous to market in the US. They challenged the industry’s claims of marketing only to informed adults.

Philip Morris, the largest domestic and international tobacco manufacturer, mounted the industry’s most active defense. Claiming to already meet national standards wherever its products were sold, PM argued that to do more would give the impression that its products were more dangerous than competitors’.

By December 1991, however, PM executive were explaining to their Board a unilateral plan to print US-style warnings on all cigarette packages, regardless of sales destination. Fair-marketing issues, regularly cited in divestment discussions, were threatening financial relations with institutional investors, notably universities. By giving up little—almost 90% of PM’s foreign-sold cigarettes already required labeling; printing expenses would be minimal; attorneys advised there would be no added legal risks—the tobacco company could eliminate a divestment issue; promote itself as flexible and open, a corporate good-citizen; and amass political capital by demonstrating self-regulation without government intervention.

This study of internal company documents shows how raising the nuisance level won activists a concession from the industry—but on a demand that may have been the more potent while it remained unmet. By spinning the concession, the industry was poised to win even bigger. Campaigns intended to delegitimize tobacco industry practices require thorough and sophisticated assessment of strategic gives and takes.

Learning Objectives: At the end of this presentation, attendees will

1)Recognize at least five factors the tobacco industry considers in deciding when to resist and when to accede to advocate demands;
• Begin to be able to assess costs and benefits of acceding to demands from the industry’s perspective;
• Be capable of formulating demands in a way that most benefits advocacy and discomforts the tobacco industry.

Keywords: Tobacco Industry, Advocacy

Presenting author's disclosure statement:
I do not have any significant financial interest/arrangement or affiliation with any organization/institution whose products or services are being discussed in this session.