245549 Insurance Structure and Chronic Disease Prevention

Monday, October 31, 2011

Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, SJD, HR Woodard Professor of Law , Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN
The structure of health insurance does not compensate insurers for long-term investments in prevention, such as those against chronic disease. This paper explores the legal structure of chronic disease treatment by insurers, illustrates the failure of the associated incentives, and explores possible improvements and recommends that subsequent insurers (including Medicare) have an obligation to compensate the prior insurer with the averted expenses on diseases that were expected but did not occur.

Learning Areas:
Public health or related public policy

Learning Objectives:
Describe the phenomenon of adverse selection Discuss some possible solutions to adverse selection

Keywords: Health Reform, Health Law

Presenting author's disclosure statement:

Qualified on the content I am responsible for because: My scholarship focuses on finance and has been cited by the S.E.C. and the Supreme Court.
Any relevant financial relationships? No

I agree to comply with the American Public Health Association Conflict of Interest and Commercial Support Guidelines, and to disclose to the participants any off-label or experimental uses of a commercial product or service discussed in my presentation.