Case of childhood obesity: Identified and statistical lives saved and the moral obligation to overcome victim and alleviation bias

In philosophy, the use of thought experiments and hypothetical cases are frequently used to help clarify complex dilemmas and to explore and justify ethical decisions. When these methods are applied to the problem of how to allocate a fair distribution of health care resources between treatment and prevention, research demonstrates that humans value treatment over prevention related to such ideas as a bias for identified victims over statistical victims, the preference for alleviating harm over preventing harm, the “rule to rescue,” the affect that compassion, spatial and temporal proximity and vividness of suffering have on decisions about real versus potential lives, and how fear influences people to treat losses as more important than comparable gains. However, the reality of increasing rates of childhood obesity, accompanied by a low chance of reversing obesity in individuals, challenges the theoretical idea that there is a moral relevant difference between identified and statistical victims that should favor identified persons. This paper, through a moral inquiry, a thought experiment and epidemiological evidence, argues that identified and statistical victims are the same people whose conditions worsen if compulsory prevention interventions are not implemented to prevent such harm and counter natural and societal factors that lead to harm. A position is taken that fairness requires social policy to value children equally by giving them equal chances at “rescue.” Also, social justice suggests that there is a stronger claim to prevent harm than to alleviate harm especially if harm is avoidable and among vulnerable populations.