

# TSCA reform legislation in the 113<sup>th</sup> Congress

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APHA session “Who’s Minding the Store?”

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## ***TSCA reform legislation in 2013***

- April 10: Safe Chemicals Act (S. 696)
  - Lead sponsor Lautenberg, 28 co-sponsors (all Ds)
- *ca. May 1: “The Vitter Bill”*
  - *Lead sponsor Vitter, ?? co-sponsors (likely 2-3 Ds)*
- May 22: Chemical Safety Improvement Act (S. 1009)
  - Lead sponsors Lautenberg and Vitter, 25 co-sponsors (12 Ds, 13 Rs)
- June 3: Lautenberg dies

## ***Safety standard/determination (Sec. 6)***

Key flaws in TSCA	Key fixes in CSIA	Trade-offs/remaining or new concerns
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Standard requires cost-benefit analysis</li> <li>• Imposes “least burdensome” requirement on any regulation</li> <li>• No definition or specific criteria to identify chemicals of concern</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Standard is applied based on health/env impacts only</li> <li>• Strikes “least burdensome” requirement</li> <li>• Requires EPA to consider exposures of vulnerable populations</li> <li>• Requires EPA to consider multiple exposures to a chemical</li> <li>• Requires EPA to use “best available science”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bans still must be based on cost-benefit</li> <li>• No explicit inclusion in standard of protection of vulnerable populations or to assess aggregate exposure</li> <li>• “Best available science” does not reference NAS recommendations</li> </ul>

## ***Existing chemicals (Sec. 6)***

Key flaws in TSCA	Key fixes in CSIA	Trade-offs/remaining or new concerns
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No mandate to review existing chemicals for safety</li> <li>• Lack of data is presumed to indicate lack of risk</li> <li>• No criteria for triggering review of an existing chemical</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires a safety review of all chemicals in active commerce</li> <li>• Lack of data is basis for high-priority designation</li> <li>• High hazard or exposure sufficient for high-priority designation</li> <li>• Requires safety determinations for all high-priority chemicals</li> <li>• Requires risk mgmt for chemicals found not to meet safety standard</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Initial review (prioritization) is based only on existing data, and lack of data does not assure high-priority ranking</li> <li>• Pace of review is unspecified, left to EPA and subject to available resources</li> <li>• Prioritization decisions not subject to court challenge (cuts both ways) and can trigger pre-emption of state authority</li> </ul>

## ***New chemicals (Sec. 5)***

<b>Key flaws in TSCA</b>	<b>Key fixes in CSIA</b>	<b>Trade-offs/remaining or new concerns</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No affirmative safety decision is required before market entry</li> <li>• Burden is on EPA to find concern even when safety data are lacking</li> <li>• Decisions are largely a “black box” because consent orders need not be made public</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An affirmative decision of “likely safety” is required for market entry</li> <li>• Prohibitions or restrictions can be imposed by order</li> <li>• All new chemical notices and orders and submitted data must be made public (subject to CBI provisions)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EPA cannot require testing of new chemicals (but can suspend review or impose conditions, as in status quo)</li> <li>• No means provided to ensure compliance for chemicals “likely” to meet safety standard (unless EPA issues a Significant New Use Rule, or SNUR)</li> </ul>

## ***Testing (Sec. 4)***

<b>Key flaws in TSCA</b>	<b>Key fixes in CSIA</b>	<b>Trade-offs/remaining or new concerns</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EPA must promulgate a regulation to require testing</li> <li>• EPA has to show potential risk or high exposure to require testing, a Catch-22</li> <li>• Testing done by consent orders is non-transparent, not always made public</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EPA can use orders to require testing (must justify why an order rather than a rule or consent agreement)</li> <li>• Testing orders avoid lengthy rulemaking and court challenges</li> <li>• EPA does not need to make risk findings to require testing</li> <li>• Testing agreements and orders and all test data must be made public (subject to CBI provisions)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Testing can only be required to do safety assessments or determinations, hence limited to chemicals in commerce deemed high-priority</li> <li>• No minimum information sets are required; all testing is on the basis of EPA demonstrating specific need</li> <li>• An overly prescriptive tiered testing framework must be followed</li> </ul>

## ***Confidential business info (Sec. 14), #1***

<b>Key flaws in TSCA</b>	<b>Key fixes in CSIA</b>	<b>Trade-offs/remaining or new concerns</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Companies can claim any information they submit to be CBI</li> <li>• Substantiation of CBI claims is typically not required</li> <li>• EPA reviews very few CBI claims and must challenge them case-by-case</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information never eligible (as well as eligible) for CBI is delineated</li> <li>• All other CBI claims must be substantiated at the time asserted</li> <li>• Resubstantiation can be required for any CBI claim upon designation of a chemical as high-priority</li> <li>• EPA must review CBI claims (all or representative subset)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only health and safety data on existing – not new – chemicals is precluded from being claimed CBI</li> <li>• Except as noted for chemical identity and high-priority chemical CBI claims, EPA cannot require documentation or redocumentation of a CBI claim made prior to the date of enactment</li> </ul>

## ***Confidential business info (Sec. 14), #2***

<b>Key flaws in TSCA</b>	<b>Key fixes in CSIA</b>	<b>Trade-offs/remaining or new concerns</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State governments cannot be given access to CBI</li> <li>• Health and medical professionals cannot be given access to CBI</li> <li>• CBI claims do not expire</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• States/localities and health professionals have access to CBI, subject to confidentiality agreements</li> <li>• For chemical identity CBI claims: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Redocumentation can be required at any time</li> <li>▪ Ready capability for reverse engineering disallows such claim</li> <li>▪ A time period must be specified for each such CBI claim and found by EPA to be reasonable</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Notifications to submitters prior to release of CBI are generally required</li> <li>• A new appeals process is provided under which claimants can challenge EPA's intention to release CBI</li> </ul>

## ***Chemical information reporting (Sec. 8)***

<b>Key flaws in TSCA</b>	<b>Key fixes in CSIA</b>	<b>Trade-offs/remaining or new concerns</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The full range and identity of chemicals in active commerce, and their producers and processors, are not known</li> <li>• Information on use of chemicals is collected only from chemical manufacturers with limited knowledge of downstream use</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Companies must notify EPA of all chemicals on the TSCA Inventory they are producing or processing (used to “reset” the Inventory)</li> <li>• Chemicals not notified as active are placed on an inactive list; a company must notify EPA before making them</li> <li>• Processor reporting is required for the first time for all chemicals in active commerce</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chemicals on the confidential portion of the TSCA Inventory can remain so if reasserted (though EPA can require (re)substantiation – see above)</li> <li>• The scope of manufacturer and processor reporting programs is left to EPA to develop through rulemaking</li> </ul>

## ***Pre-emption (Sec. 18), #1***

<b>TSCA</b>	<b>CSIA</b>	<b>Issues/Concerns</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• States can’t require testing of a chemical “for purposes similar to those” for which EPA requires testing</li> <li>• If EPA regulates a chemical by rule, States can only: (a) have the identical requirement or (b) regulate it under a different Federal law or (c) entirely prohibit the chemical in the State</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• States can’t require testing “reasonably likely to produce the same data” as EPA requires, or require notification of uses of a chemical for which EPA requires the same notification</li> <li>• States can’t establish or continue to enforce a requirement that restricts a chemical once EPA has completed a safety determination on the chemical</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• States need to be able to enact requirements identical to EPA’s to allow for co-enforcement</li> <li>• “Restriction” can be read broadly to apply to warning labels, etc. (e.g., CA Prop 65)</li> <li>• The safety determination doesn’t regulate a chemical found not to meet the safety standard; the trigger for any preemption should be the final risk management rule required for such chemicals</li> </ul>

## ***Pre-emption (Sec. 18), #2***

<b>TSCA</b>	<b>CSIA</b>	<b>Issues/Concerns</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Only final rules or orders have a pre-emptive effect</li> <li>• Waivers available for State requirements that are more protective and don't unduly burden interstate commerce</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• States can't impose a <u>new</u> restriction on a chemical once EPA has: (a) designated it low-priority, or (b) for high-priority chemicals, upon publication of EPA's schedule for conducting a safety assessment and determination</li> <li>• Waivers available if State cannot wait for EPA to act or EPA finds its actions are being unreasonably delayed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low-priority designations can't be challenged in court as final EPA actions</li> <li>• The trigger for any preemption should only be (a) a determination that a chemical meets the safety standard or (b) the risk management rule required for chemicals found not to meet the standard</li> <li>• States must also show "compelling local" conditions or interests and sufficient scientific basis to obtain waivers</li> </ul>

### ***An overarching concern: Time to action***

Lack of deadlines and major new procedural requirements = long delay before decisions

Conservative timeline for implementation:

- *Date of enactment to:*
  - first prioritized chemicals = 39 months or 3.25 years
  - first final safety determination = 86 months or 7.17 years
  - first final rule imposing restrictions = 104 months or 8.67 years

## ***Key improvements needed***

- more deadlines, fewer procedural requirements
- defining and explicitly protecting vulnerable populations
- narrowing the bill's preemption of state authority to ensure that states can act when EPA does not
- ensuring low-priority designations of chemicals are based on sufficient hazard and exposure information and do not preempt state authority
- providing EPA with adequate resources, with a fair share coming from industry

## ***For more information***

*EDF's Chemicals Policy Webpage*  
[www.edf.org/health/policy/chemicals-policy-reform](http://www.edf.org/health/policy/chemicals-policy-reform)

*EDFHealth Blog*  
<http://blogs.edf.org/health/>