4143.0: Tuesday, November 14, 2000 - 1:30 PM

Abstract #16922

Tax Credits for Health Insurance Purchase

Jonathan Gruber, PhD, Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142, 617-253-8892, gruberj@mit.edu

The continued rise in the uninsured population has led to considerable interest in tax-based policies to raise the level of insurance coverage. Using a detailed microsimulation model for evaluating these policies, we find that while tax subsidies could significantly increase insurance coverage, even very generous tax policies could not cover more than a sizable minority of the uninsured population. For example, a generous refundable credit that costs $13 billion per year would reduce the ranks of the uninsured by only four million persons. We also find that the efficiency of tax policies, in terms of the cost per newly insured, inevitably would fall as more of the uninsured were covered.

Learning Objectives: Analyze the ability of tax policy to reduce the number of uninsured

Keywords: Health Insurance, Universal Coverage

Presenting author's disclosure statement:
Organization/institution whose products or services will be discussed: None
I do not have any significant financial interest/arrangement or affiliation with any organization/institution whose products or services are being discussed in this session.

The 128th Annual Meeting of APHA