A benchmark system to optimize our defense against an attack on the U.S. food supply using computer simulation modeling

BACKGROUND: September 11, 2001 heightened public awareness to national security and events that followed (anthrax through the mail) characterized the need for emergency response.  Although most food safety and response efforts have focused mainly on unintentional contamination, a deliberate “successful” attack would have a major impact on public health, emergency response and the private sector. 

METHODS: A computerized simulation model was developed to measure the effectiveness of responding to food system attacks based on current levels of performance (prevention, protection, response and recovery) in reducing morbidities and mortalities resulting from a food terrorist attack.  Preliminary validation was established using table top and functional exercises from participants representing federal, state, local and private sector organizations. 

RESULTS: The model showed that if the attack had not been mitigated, then the consequences would have been over 70,000 illnesses and 40,000 mortalities spread around Georgia, Florida and South Carolina.  The combined effects of the detection of the contaminant, stop movement/stop sale of the product and the public service announcement to the appropriate media reduced morbidities and mortalities by approximately 60%.  The total number of cities that would have been involved in the incident decreased from seventy three to forty seven, therefore reducing the human health impact to be within a range that is much more manageable with immediately available health care resources.

CONCLUSIONS: The results of the model provide justification for funding related to public health investments to improve operational effectiveness of public and private sectors in preventing and responding to food terror attacks.